Friday 17 February 2012

A Book Review: The Cracked Bell

The Fetishism of Freedom

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher once described America as the only country in the world “built upon an idea,” freedom. Whilst scholars of nationalism may choose to take argument with this statement, the central claim of Riley-Smith’s book is that even if the United States is not the only country built upon an idea, the fundamental principle of liberty is the idea upon which America is built. Inevitably, claims Riley-Smith, when a value such as liberty is the bedrock of a nation’s way of life, it brings about challenges and, in this case, seven paradoxes that define the “American crisis”.

In a field full of books about America from the British perspective, Riley-Smith’s contribution stands out from the crowd in two respects. Firstly, he has seen the British view of the American way from the perspective of the British Embassy – giving him the establishment focus. Secondly, and most importantly, his training as a social anthropologist has given him the cultural focus, the reference points and the methodology to make his account of the American fetishism and its consequent paradoxes contrast with the societies beneath the radar that have so often formed the basis of the social anthropologist’s studies. Riley-Smith’s training in the method of social anthropology, the ethnography – whereby the student of the society lives with the focus of their studies and makes observations about their lifestyle broadly from the vantage point of a critical citizen – makes this an account rich in quantitative and qualitative data and perceptions from Liberty Central itself. From this perspective, we here have what is a fresh and healthy addition to the debate on American liberty that has been ongoing since the Federalists and Anti-Federalists picked up their pens in 1787 to debate the merits of the new constitution.

The focus on seven key paradoxes of the American way – race, belief, innovation, the frontier, war/empire and freedom/conformity - is the backbone of this work. Each one provides an insight into the contrasting trend in their respective area that features in American life and each chapter could be read independently. Together, they helpfully frame how American society can be conceptualised, from the states that challenged the founding fathers to the ethnic classifications (and much more besides) that have confronted successive generations of American leaders, as the attempt to make e pluribus unum – out of the many, one. This was most obviously the case when the founding fathers sought to unify the thirteen newly sovereign colonies of the American continent after acquiring their independence from Britain, yet the paradoxes are so central to the American way that they persist and present challenges even today. In the opening chapter on race, for example, Riley-Smith highlights how America’s ethnicities are often defined by their status vis-à-vis the current dominant group (we need hardly remember the role of race in America’s natural sin, slavery, and how fundamental it was to the structure of society). However, despite this debunking of the “melting pot” in favour of a stew of mixed yet individual parts co-existing with bouts of animosity, the concept and identity of America belongs to every citizen in a way few countries can equal (for example, whereas 9% of Britons are currently living abroad, only 0.5% of Americans are).

For many Britons, America is a country that inspires admiration, envy, mockery and disdain – occasionally all at the same time. The basis of this, one may be led to infer, is the perceived purity of the former colonial master contrasted to the perceived perversion evident in the American way (although the dramatic changes in British society over the past fifty years contrasted with American constitutional fundamentalism poses a significant challenge to this). Therefore, chapter 8 is where the book really comes into its own when it shifts from the seven paradoxes of American life to a contrast between Britain and America asking a key question: are they an equation or an angle - do they equate or do they begin on the same basis (freedom) and diverge from that point. Here it becomes clear that the strongest cultural affinity in the Western world and the much-talked about political bilateral “special relationship” is indeed based on a shared heritage and a continued base of mutual interests. However, what becomes equally clear is that the two countries have since diverged significantly. In areas of race, tensions persist in both countries however Britain, Riley-Smith suggests, is structured much more on a dichotomy of “us and them” whilst each independent ethnic minority avoids being assimilated into one of two groups in the United States. Similarly, both countries have a penchant for consumerism, but in America it is taken to a degree that makes its European counterparts appear frugal to the extreme. Furthermore, both societies have Christian routes, but whilst American society has become increasingly proactive in its evangelism, Britain’s has become more and more secular. And so on. In almost every case, both countries begin at the same point, and broadly continue to hold similar core values, but Britain’s drifting towards the American way is constantly challenged and eventually mediated by its ultimate status as a European nation. In due course, key distinctions have developed in the Anglo-America.

Aside from this exploration of how the basis of the Anglosphere has branched out and fragmented, the book’s most interesting focus comes in chapter two when Riley-Smith focuses on something which has come to define America and was the bedrock of its power around the world - consumerism. Indeed, it is true to say that if liberty is the value of America, consumerism is its activity in a way that it never was for its European ancestors (its dominance in this area even surpassing Britain’s at the height of its Empire). This is epitomised by the decor of the U.S. Library of Congress featuring “commerce” amongst the other pillars of its national identity (history, art, philosophy, law, science etc). However, whereas law is the basis of civil society, philosophy the basis of theoretical conceptions and science the heart of endeavour, commerce for America need not possess any further goals – effective commerce is now, as it was for ascetic founders like Benjamin Franklin, a normative end in itself. For a social anthropologist like Riley-Smith, whose initial studies will have involved the study of gift-exchange societies, this will be especially important. Whereas the kula ring of the Trobriand tribe (a central study in Social Anthropology), through which shell bracelets and necklaces were exchanged, was the basis for social relations, American consumerism is not. It is instead an operation that centralises unknown relations between purchaser and consumer as the basis of economic life with its social consequences extending no further than the individual. This, along with the extent to which consumerism has reached quasi-religious status for many Americans, is amongst the standout observations of this book.

It is here, on consumerism, that reader may suspect Riley-Smith truly believes the issue at the hub of the American crisis lies. In his afterword, Riley-Smith allegorically speaks of the American society as either Hobbesville (after 17th Century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes whose emphasis lay on individual passions leading to war if unchecked) or Hobbiton (referring to J. R. R. Tolkein’s homogenous hobbit societies). Riley-Smith asserts that “the social cohesiveness of Hobbiton is undercut by the hyper-individualism of Hobbesville” is the underlying tension wrestling at the heart of American society. This individualism almost certainly finds strength in the extreme consumerism of America which consequently manifests itself in areas such as race and belief. If anywhere, this is where this work lets the reader down; it ought to focus more on how the individualist consumer is lacking the social framework to create a homogenous society and avert crisis, in the manner of Durkheim’s anomie, in modern-day America.

If America is, as Riley-Smith asserts, in a crisis then he is in no doubt that it is as a consequence of its liberty. However, as this work shows throughout, many areas of American life contain paradoxes, several of which even stand in contention with one another and result in a balance that founding fathers such as Madison often desired. Therefore we must take the foundational remit of this book and pursue more critically what truly underwrites the American paradoxes - consumerism. There ought to be a sequel to this book. Consumerism ought to be its focus.

Purchase ‘The Cracked Bell’ here.

Thursday 16 February 2012

The One True Ideological Debate in British Politics?


Douglas Murray and Peter Hitchens on Start the Week.

Regular listeners of Start the Week, Andrew Marr's regular Monday morning radio show, will have heard a fascinating debate recently about the true nature of conservatism. During it, Douglas Murray spoke of the need for ideology in politics and how the only true ideological debate in politics today is that of the benefits cap - the fundamental principle that people should not earn more on benefits than the average family at work. Peter Hitchens, never one to be contented with anything at all, suggested the government was not showing ideological commitment (heaven forbid Peter should agree with the Prime Minister on anything) but an act of triangulation. Achieve the opposition of liberal bishops and the Labour Party and people will be convinced that you are acting in a conservative manner.

For many conservatives (big C and small C alike) this is one of the biggest wins of this Parliament. In the first instance, the Labour Party has set itself up against hard-working families on low and middle incomes, giving the impression of supporting those on long-term benefits rather than the working class. Secondly, having realised their mistake, the Labour Party backtracked into supporting a benefits cap but only if it was regionalised (in my opinion, the politics of this aside, there is much to be said for this position). In doing so, the Labour Party surrendered the idea that people ought to be compensated to varying degrees depending on where they live in the country. Expect this to be seized upon by the government if future austerity measures are needed.

But for many, this debate is not one about being a true conservative. I don't know about your experience, but most of the Labour voters I know are in favour of this policy, passionately (especially the party's working-class supporters, who form the bedrock of its voters). To many, it seems almost instinctive that if the benefits system is all a fall-back for people during tough times, and not an alternative way of life, then people on benefits should not be better off than those who do not require the fall-back.


I don't think the benefits cap is an ideological battle at all. It is the action of a government recognising a long overdue policy and the action of an opposition seeking to demonstrate its ineptitude. If Murray wants to look for an ideological batter, he should look elsewhere.

Tuesday 14 February 2012

The Next Vice President of the United States?



None of the remaining GOP candidates are enough to win by themselves.


When, at the Republican National Convention in Tampa, the circus of primaries and caucuses to choose the Republican nominee comes to an end, that will not be the only issue settled. The other will be the second on the ticket - the Republican candidate for Vice President of the United States.


In the coming months, expect speculation to increase about who the presumptive nominee is going to choose for his running mate. And expect pundits from all sides of the spectrum to give their analysis of how each candidate can be factored through one of the toughest political equations there is - the pros and cons of certain candidates and how they compliment and make up for the flaws of the Presidential candidate.


For the past couple of years, I have had a man in mind who I think would add great weight to any Republican ticket in the coming years (unless you have known me for so long as I have been saying it, I can't verify this to you. But I hope you'll err in my favour). He is the Junior Senator for Florida, Marco Rubio.


Rubio's strengths are significant. For one, he's a Senator from Florida, one of the most important states in the electoral college. This can help deliver this state for the Republicans and, more than that, help secure the South. Secondly, he's conservative - "severely" so. In 2010, Rubio was the Tea Party choice in Florida above the incumbent Governor who was seeking to join the Senate, Chris Christie. This will boost the ticket's credibility amongst Republicans who have been reluctant to support Romney so far.


Thirdly, he has the story. Romney is a former Governor (Massachusetts) and a wealthy man. Romney's dad was a former Governor (Michigan) and a wealthy man. This need not detract from Romney (Jnr) in any way, but it is not an engaging story of a rise to the top. Rubio is the child of immigrant parents who came to the United States seeking to benefit from the American dream.  Through their struggle, he embodies what American still feel is great about their nation.


The past two Vice Presidential selections have been interesting; George W. Bush chose Cheney knowing he never wanted to seek the top job and Barack Obama chose Biden knowing he would be too old by 2016 to consider a run for President himself. This election, the Republicans have a chance to select a Vice Presidential candidate who may well want to, and most certainly can, go on to "lead the free world." No matter who the candidate is, they should run with Rubio.

Sunday 12 February 2012

My New Hero of Late-Night TV



Why Alan Johnson MP is different and the Labour Party should learn from him.


I have to make a confession; I think I have a crush on Alan Johnson. Of course, I don't actually have a crush on Mr Johnson. He's 61, for a start. And out of my league for a finish. But the frequent star of This Week embodies something in the Labour Party that I haven't really seen since Blair was Prime Minister - an easy charm, a casual appearance of honesty and an instant trustability.


The current Labour top four, who Johnson resigned from last year for "personal reasons" under accusations of incompetence, have one characteristic in common more than anything else. Ed Miliband, Yvette Cooper, Douglas Alexander and Ed Balls... all worked for Gordon Brown in opposition and in government. The rivalry that began with John Smith's death in 1994 has been decisively settled - and despite their inability to ever win an election, the Brownites have won. And they have brought his character traits to the fore with them.


As such, the public do not seem to engage with them well. Ed Miliband's issues in public have been amply discussed in recent months. Be it harsh or otherwise, the Labour leader is not a figure people take to quickly. The over-riding impression is of the man who knifed his brother (an assertion I myself find absurdly unfair but an effective line of attack). 


But what is true for Miliband is also true for the rest of his top team. In public, they come across as either too combative at the wrong times, in denial about what they did when they were in government or unable to win the debate on the seminal issue of this Parliament, the economy. Even Yvette Cooper, who many on the left feel is the woman to stick it to Cameron & co, doesn't poll positively. Not to mention the inevitability of the "if she didn't have the judgement not to marry Ed Balls, how can we possibly trust her to run the country" lines should she ever become leader. Incest in the Labour Party would continue to provide punch lines for the Conservatives.


Johnson didn't prove very effective as Shadow Chancellor in the opening months of this Parliament, but he does have something that few of his successors have - the ability to be liked (seemingly harsh but evidently true, I feel). Johnson's past as a postman who worked his way up through the unions, his easy-going nature and ability to engage with people on the sofa are huge assets that have always worked well in politics. The current Labour team could learn a lot from him.

The Economics of Happiness

A hyperbolic film misdiagnoses the issues of the global economy... but with an interesting point worth raising.

Last week, I went to see a screening of 'The Economics of Happiness'. This is an interesting film that raises some really important issues about the state of 21st Century capitalism. For one, it asks whether globalisation has helped create ethnic conflict. Similarly, it raised issues about cultural self-rejection through the exposure of once autonomous peoples to western culture - the potential drifting towards an ever-more unified global culture (a homogeneous culture, if you will). 

But the film gets its analysis wrong time and time again. It suggests that globalisation is creating ethnic tensions and conflicts in the world, without making any attempt to consider the pre-globalised world. Had they done so, they would appreciate the relative levels of peace we are experiencing today (perhaps surprising considering we are aware of all the countries and cultures with which we can find reason to fight). And the film is wrong too to suggest that it is bad for other countries to be too heavily exposed to Western culture and want to emulate it. I could not Tweet from my iPad, text from my smartphone or blog from my laptop whilst looking others straight in the eye and say "you wouldn't want this." I wouldn't give it up; why should they not have the chance to experience it? (I realise this is an intense and complex issue, so will address it in a future blogpost).

But this misguided and sentimentalised documentary makes one outstanding point about the current state of global political economy. The first is this; we have got the balance wrong between deregulation at the international level and regulation at the domestic level. Over the preceding decades, geographical regions around the world have sought free trade agreements (most notably the European Union's single market and the North American Free Trade Agreement). As I type, the EU and the Republic of India are in negotiations for what would be the largest free-trade bloc, in terms of population, in the world. Broadly speaking, this is a good move for the world economy. 


But at the same time, paradoxically, states have increasingly regulated their domestic economies. The reasons for this are hard to explain, but the effects are easy to detect - an easing of the practicalities of trade for big Multi-National Corporations whilst making it tougher for local small and medium sized businesses in domestic markets, the exact sort of companies that government's so often feel are key to their economic success.

The trend, to me, feels pretty clear. Its the solution that is going to be the difficult bit. International systems of regulation struggle to get as much support as they would need to be enacted (as discussion of the Tobin tax demonstrated, irrespective of the case for or against the tax itself). But something has to be done to offer small companies the level-playing field that they need to compete domestically and in foreign markets. Failure to do so will lead to even larger companies that begin to achieve monopolies. Such would be the destruction of the global economic system by the success of its own actors.

Saturday 11 February 2012

In Tribute to Whitney Houston


This is not a political post - politicos, look away now. But the past few years have been exceptionally sad for the musical industry, with some of the most influential musicians of their respective generations passing away at the end of confused and tragic lives. First Michael Jackson. Then Amy Winehouse. And now, tragically, Whitney Houston, at the age of just 48.

For many people of my generation (a child of the 90s... just), we grew up listening to our parents - let's be honest, usually our mums - listening to Whitney Houston. She is etched into the canvas of my childhood and, without knowing why, the words to her songs come into my mind whenever I listen to one.

Throughout her life, she was blighted with tragedy. But today is not a day to reflect on the foibles of a person's life unless to learn the lessons of it. Today just remains a truly sad day. RIP Whitney Houston.

Normal service resumes later today.

In Defence of Andrew Lansley

File:Andrew Lansley MP -NHS Confederation annual conference, Manchester-8July2011.jpg


Shed a tear for Andrew Lansley. Genuinely, do.


This is not a blog post about the current Health and Social Care Bill going through Parliament - that is a weighty topic with many considerations - but about the man who is responsible for it. 


In the past few days, the self-proclaimed voice of the conservative grassroots ConservativeHome have published two articles; one calling for the Bill to be dropped, the other calling for Lansley to be. The war of words between Lansley's supporters and his new critics has become increasingly bitter. And increasingly unfair on the man caught in the cross-fire.


Nobody doubts Andrew Lansley's passion for the NHS (those who do treat their politics too cynically and have misread the situation entirely, in my opinion). The NHS is part of Andrew Lansley's lifeblood. From its inception in 1948, his dad worked in the NHS. His first wife was a doctor. In 1992, he suffered a stroke and experienced the NHS firsthand. And upon joining Parliament as the MP for South Cambridgeshire in 1997, he immediately became a member of the Health Select Committee. His exposure to and interest in the NHS and the people who work in it has been second to none amongst many Parliamentarians.


He's also been thinking about the future of the Health Service, and how he could be the man to deliver it, since 2004. He's held the Health brief for his party longer than Cameron has been leader, Osborne has been Chancellor/Shadow Chancellor and even before Cabinet Ministers like Michael Gove were in Parliament. Lansley is a man committed to his brief. And this has been recognised by the Labour Party. Despite his current criticisms, Andy Burnham has said in the past (I cannot find the source, so I paraphrase) "nobody cares more about the future of our NHS than Andrew Lansley." He's right; nobody does.


But things have gone wrong for Lansley recently. What is increasingly clear is that he is not the best communicator of the policies he is aiming to introduce (although public sector reform can be so complex it is difficult to articulate effectively without cheapening it). But this is not sufficient for having him "taken outside and shot." The ability to communicate effectively, whilst important, must be second to a politician's ability to get the right policies in place.


The current Conservative infighting about Andrew Lansley should come to an end. There are lessons to be learnt from this past week (for example, other Cabinet ministers should be out there making the case for NHS reform, too). But he must now be left to get on with the job he's trained so long to do. To do otherwise, and waste so much knowledge, interest and passion would be a sad day for the Cabinet, for British politics and, most importantly, for our NHS.

Friday 10 February 2012

Explaining Romney's Disastrous Tuesday


Why is Romney doing badly in some of the states where he once did so well?


One of the remarkable things about Rick Santorum's surge on Tuesday night against Mitt Romney was this; in 2008, Romney finished only four percent behind John McCain in Missouri, in Minnesota he won by a margin of 19% and in Colorado, over 60% of the votes cast were for Gov. Romney. Four years later, he was beaten in all three states by Rick Santorum, and by healthy margins in most of them.


Two explanations spring forward; firstly, these states do not like backing the obvious front-runner and look for a candidate perceived to be to his/her right. In 2008, the presumptive candidate was Sen. John McCain (having won big in Florida, as Romney did this time). In the states that followed, Republican voters were looking to support a less establishment more conservative candidate. In 2008, that was Romney. This time, Romney is the establishment candidate and has nobody else to run to the right of.


The second explanation is a much scarier one for Team Romney. It was once suggested to me that despite all of the hype and the certainty around the Romney candidacy, he would not win his party's nomination. Why? Because he had run just four years earlier and people need more than four years to consider supporting a loser again (recent history can find challenges to this, of course, like Ronald Reagan in 1980, but the rule applies fairly well). The big risk for Romney is that in states like Colorado, who put so much faith in him last time, they are not willing to support him again so soon after he failed.


Tuesday's defeats are not a disaster for Romney. After winning Florida in 2008, John McCain went on to lose fifteen states before finally securing the nomination. To do likewise, Romney needs to continue to take the fight to President Obama whilst letting his supporters undermine his Republican opponents. In order to win the nomination, Romney must stop appearing the guaranteed winner of the primaries and appear to his party as the presumptive winner of the Presidency.

Saturday 4 February 2012

Forget the peas; give me peace.

The study of politics can sometimes seem a paradox – why is it that the most dynamic of the humanities (arguably changing day-to-day with events) focuses so much on a classic body of politics works? Perpetual Peas, whose very name stems from a classic political text, stands by this paradox as a healthy contribution to the debate on modern-day politics, providing the arguments of old are advanced through new contexts. So, let us consider a classic political text and what it can teach us today, beginning with Immanuel Kant’s ‘Perpetual Peace’ (1795).

When Kant began focusing his writings on politics towards the end of his life, he aimed to tackle some of the central issues of the discipline. Few of these issues have remained so consistently a focus of politics than the quest for peace. In Kant’s Century, Europe was frequently torn apart by wars of continental Empires and in the last century millions of people died in the only two conflicts ever (if not somewhat inaccurately) awarded the status of “world war.” In 2012, it can seem as if Britain has been so long at peace domestically that we need not obsess over how to achieve peace at all. Britain’s success in this area is worth noting; however a consistent aversion to war remains central of our international conduct in a way few of our ancestors would have recognised. Whilst it is, for example, unthinkable that Britain would go to war with a fellow European power does this mean that we have achieved perpetual peace, and have we done so in the way Kant thought we would?

To answer this, let us first consider what Kant felt were the means of achieving political objectives. In the appendixes to his essay, Kant makes it clear that the best way of achieving an end is to create a framework so that this end inevitably come about. In perpetual peace, for example, Kant looks at the conduct of states and what that must be (states must be democratic, not break treaties, not enter into debt for war or hold standing armies) so that peace is the inevitable consequence of all of these components. This is perhaps the great lesson we can take from this work of Kant’s – the pursuit of an end can be fruitless unless the framework for it to come about and thrive is in place.

In this light, Kant speaks of how the consequences of war are too great for most rational people to burden willingly – and as such, many wars have been the consequence of leaders failing to represent the general will of their people. There are events in history to challenge this (such as the cheering crowds that welcome WWI), but as more and more states have become democratic and accountable to their people, fewer and fewer of these states have gone to war (and according to Democratic Peace Theory, democracies simply do not go to war with each other). This was key to Kant's framework for peace - some elements of his treaty for peace have been realised and their consequences have been as predicted.

Not all of Kant’s goals are being realised – but we are certainly moving in the direction he predicted. More states than ever are democratic, with the Arab Spring promising to inaugurate a new wave of middle-eastern states into the democracy club. The true realisation of Kant’s ultimate goal is still a long way off and it faces many challenges ahead. But this isn’t a problem – Kant believes human reason would grow and perpetual peace materialise anyway. We have cause for optimism that he was right.

Read ‘Perpetual Peace’ as part of Kant’s Political Writings in this Cambridge series of books by clicking here.

Want to know about Barack Obama?

Right now, all politicos are considering the plausible candidates in the Republican field (ranging from the very plausible, Romney, to the incomprehensible Paul). However, American re-elections are generally viewed by voters as a referendum on the incumbent. So we ought not forgot the guy in the White House who will be fighting for four more years in November.


What are the requirements of standing for the Presidency of the United States? Chief amongst them... write a book. This was Barack Obama's bestselling contribution to this Presidential rite of passage. The frankest tale you will ever read? I suspect not. The most analytical approach to his doctrine for government? Questionable also. But it will tell you how he views himself, what he wants you to think of him and most importantly, given its selling figures, how its millions of readers have come to know the man. Purchase here.



Described by Barack Obama as "a remarkable study in leadership," many have come to view this as the basis for Barack Obama's Presidential style. Goodwin focuses on Lincoln in this book in a way that some have deemed uncritical, but knowledge of the the no. 1 U.S. President (according to most surveys of citizens and former Presidents), who most current inhabitants of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue would give their left leg to be compared to, is essential in understanding the self-perceived benchmark in iconography and leadership. Purchase here.



If you want to understand the values behind Obama, and their application to contemporary political philosophy, this is the book for you. At its core, it is an attempt to put Obama in the most fascinating of contexts by relating him to traditional bodies of political theory. If you know, or want to know, something about political philosophy, this is an absolute must-read. One of the few books you can finish and feel genuinely more intelligent at the final page than you did on the first! Purchase here.



Renshon, a political psychologist, analyses the psychology of Obama, primarily in reference to the concept of redemption, to assess in a unique light the benefits and limitations of his time in the White House. A fascinating, if not a weighty, read. Purchase here.

In a previous life, The Abolition of Britain



On a different blog, I wrote a blog reviewing one of Peter Hitchens' seminal books, The Abolition of Britain.So that anybody who takes a liking to this blog has past material to read, it is reprinted here.

An Image of Britain Unlikely to Return

(Hitchens, P. 2008. The Abolition of Britain: From Winston Churchill to Princess Diana. London: Continuum.)

Chapter fourteen opens with the words “smoking and buggery can both kill you.” Chapter eight, which discusses single parent families, is called “A real bastard.” And in Chapter fifteen, Peter Hitchens accuses those who supported then and continue to support now the abolition of the death penalty of being “prepared to accept the death of innocent people… rather than allow something they believed to be a morally repulsive punishment to continue.” On the face of it, these are the tell-tale signs of over-dramatized language being used to attract attention through controversy. This is the big frustration of reading ‘The Abolition of Britain’; Peter Hitchens has his sights set on controversy at the expense of rational argument so that you have to fight through the over-inflated language and the poorly conceived arguments to get at what is a valuable contribution to the political debate. On this basis, this book could be written off as drivel. But deep deep down are some valuable points to make us stop, think and reflect upon the changes in British society in the past forty years.

For example, many of us care deeply about whether or not there ought to be a core body of knowledge at the centre of the history specification in secondary schools. The plight of single parent mothers in this country, who suffer worse economic conditions on average than a married couple, is something that really ought to be highlighted more. Others regret the demise of Christianity in Britain, some the perceived sexual promiscuity of the modern nation and many the decline in a sense of pride about being British. Whilst you may not agree with all of these points, there is certainly room in contemporary British political debate for them and plurality demands that their case is persuasively made. Yet Peter Hitchens, perhaps the most prominent flag-bearer for such views, is doing such very great harm to these very views he wishes to encourage.

The most blatant demonstration of this is the book’s relentless idealising of the past whilst demonizing the present. Peter Hitchens always denies that this is what he is doing. However, when he says so he is lying to himself and to his readers. In chapter one Hitchens describes a girl from 1997 being transported to 1965, who would, he suggests, “feel entirely safe as she travelled late at night on the London Underground” and would wonder “what has happened to taste and education in the lost years between [1965 and 1997?]” Later, he even goes on to say that these changes, which nobody really asked for, “brought about misery, decadence and ignorance” from “one of the happiest, fairest and kindest societies which has ever existed…” Demonstrably, Hitchens is idealising the past and demonizing the future to a hyperbolic degree. This instantly compromises the persuasiveness of his argument; few people are willing to believe that they are living in such a bankrupt age as he describes.

To believe that the past is better than today is not necessarily a bad thing. Indeed, many who oppose the individualism and consumerism of the 1980s and long for a return to stable working-class mining communities may be inclined to sympathise. However, this view is problematised when a moral element, claiming eternality and universality, is added to such considerations. Peter Hitchens takes this conceptualisation of Britain at an idealised time and implies than the prominence of Christianity, the lack of contraception and the social and legal disapproval of homosexuality were moral issues and virtuous positions. However, the way in which he does this shows minimal care for the moral principle itself. For example, Hitchens speaks in great detail of the beauty and majesty of the King James Version of the Holy Bible. One would be hard pushed to deny that this seminal book in the development of Western Christianity is of central importance and is written in way that the more sentimental, at least, would call beautiful. However, what Hitchens fails to comprehend is that for Christians the Bible is about the word of God being shared and understood. Therefore, why cherish a version which is an inaccurate translation of the word of God when more accurate, not to mention more readable, translations are available? The answer is very clear; Hitchens is not concerned with the principle at hand - the position of Christianity in the UK - so much as clinging on to the remnants of an age we have moved beyond.

Out of this fixation with the past comes a series of what many of us (no doubt labelled the “liberal elite” by Hitchens) would consider bigotries. For example, Hitchens cleverly veils controversial statements by quoting people who said them at the time the debate was taking place, usually the 1960s. However, at no stage does Hitchens criticise those who, for example, opposed the legalisation of homosexuality in the 1960s. Of Hitchens rare personal comments in this section, he only takes time to praise them for the accuracy of their prophecies about what it would do to society. On the basis of pseudo-morality Hitchens is encouraging the prejudices of old where in reality many, including evangelical Christians, are now unwilling to hypocritically criticise their fellow “miserable sinners” in such terms.

Together these culminate in Hitchens’ conceptualisation of “Britain,” although to define such an old nation in such historically narrow terms is beyond absurd. However, if we indulge Hitchens for a period and accept his definition of Britain, it certainly could be said that the Britain of old, the one that he pines for, has been abolished. Indeed, we are no longer homophobic as we were, tolerance is now a normative term (the idea, for example, of D.H. Lawrence’s ‘Lady Chatterley’s Lover’ being freely published no longer causes horror) and Britain is no longer a country that speaks proudly of having conquered a quarter of the world – at times brutally. This is not the abolition of a nation – it is the evolving of a nation and, by many accounts, the ameliorating of it. The Britain of old has been transformed – but with any dynamic nation that goes without saying – and a Britain more at ease with itself and its citizens has taken its place. 

Peter Hitchens speaks of a new liberal elite, detached from the public, who imposed all of these cultural changes upon people. There is something worth exploring in this analysis of the masses relationship with their political elite – but the new elite is not as hegemonic or authoritarian as he implies in this book. After all, if they were authoritarian (as much as those Peter seems to support when they tried to prevent ‘Lady Chatterley’s Lover’ being published in 1960) they would never have allowed this book to be published. I, for one, am glad that is was. However, those who share a number of Peter Hitchens’ views ought to regret its publication. Its author and its style does their case no credit and if they ever want to succeed and reclaim some of the Britain that was once theirs, they need to find a new advocate.

You can purchase ‘The Abolition of Britain’ here.